Israel has a unique reconstruction challenge resulting from Oct. 7 - opinion

As the world’s attention is centered on the war in Gaza, the State of Israel faces another colossal challenge far from the international eye: the establishment of a national rehabilitation system on a historical scale. 

Hamas’s operation, named “Al-Aqsa Flood,” indeed left behind destruction akin to a flood, hurricane, or other natural disaster. Beyond the 1,200 killed in the attack, the battles have left a whole region in ruins. 

Some 28 settlements and two cities were attacked by 3,000 terrorists who destroyed infrastructure such as roads and public institutions, burned homes, and stole much equipment. Entire systems, such as the education system, with many teachers killed, have ceased to operate. About 164,000 Israelis were evacuated from their homes following state directives, and an additional 100,000-150,000 decided to evacuate on their own initiative.

Israel needs to rehabilitate its infrastructure on a national scale while simultaneously addressing the multifaceted needs of evacuated citizens, the wounded, trauma victims, uprooted families, and shattered communities. These are characteristics similar to the rehabilitation required after a major natural disaster. However, Israel, a country with few natural disasters (ranked 157th in the world out of 171 in terms of natural disaster occurrences), has little significant experience implementing such recovery efforts.

The last natural disaster Israel faced was the Carmel Forest fire (2010), which claimed 44 lives, forced the evacuation of about 17,000 people, and resulted in the burning of nearly 25 sq. km., including several million trees. Most rehabilitation efforts focused on nature restoration and learning from the failed management of extinguishing efforts. However, the rehabilitation effort for the destroyed homes, minimally funded by the state, dragged on for years, due to difficulties between the government, local council, insurance companies, and residents.

The unsuccessful recovery management by the Sela Administration – established by the state to oversee resettlement and compensation for Israeli citizens evacuated from the Gaza Strip during the 2005 Disengagement – is another example. The administration faced significant public criticism and a lack of cooperation and trust from the evacuees and failed to meet its goals efficiently. For instance, four years after the disengagement, 63% of the evacuees had not yet begun building a house, and the administration was blamed for inefficiently managing the allocated budgets. Today, the Sela Administration is perceived as a symbol of the state’s failure in rehabilitation efforts.

However, in the mission of rehabilitating the Gaza border communities, as in the war with Hamas, Israel cannot afford to fail. The Tkuma (“Rebirth”) Administration, established shortly after the disaster, set particularly ambitious goals and is currently budgeted at NIS 18 billion for five years. Natural disaster recovery has two main aspects: infrastructure and community. 

Gaza border recovery

However, the Gaza border recovery has another aspect: the rehabilitation of national pride. The leaders of Tkuma decided not only to return to the pre-war status but also committed to doubling the population and establishing new projects in tourism, higher education, industry, memorial sites, and more. 

With natural disasters, one generally needs to consider whether it is right to resettle the disaster area at all. There is no point in doubling the population of an area prone to many more floods. After all, when there is a hurricane, one does not say, “Let’s build double the houses and show the hurricane who’s in control!”

There are few precedents for rehabilitating an entire area after a terror event, as most are relatively localized. The closest case is 9/11, which, like the Israeli case, required not only physical rehabilitation of the area in terms of businesses and residential buildings but also included an element of rehabilitating national pride. In hindsight, it can be said that the rehabilitation largely met its goals, yet even after 20 years, there were still unfinished recovery and restoration efforts.

ONE OF the first problems Israel is expected to encounter is the citizens’ impatience with the pace of recovery. At the beginning of the war, it was stated that the rehabilitation was expected to last 2-3 years, far less than the existing models in disaster recovery, which have four phases of recovery (emergency, restoration, replacement, and major reconstruction) that last at least 10 years, with each phase lasting longer than the previous one (from a few days to many years).

Moreover, despite the extensive budgeting, it is estimated that the recovery will cost more than the current plan. Around the world, studies predict an increase in the costs of natural disaster recovery efforts. Many countries (such as the disaster-prone USA) have gained experience and created comparative benchmarks to produce accurate cost estimates for rehabilitation in cases of property destruction in natural disasters. In Israel, which lacks prior comparative expertise, one should be prepared for a price tag significantly above the NIS 18 billion allocated – and will require an additional budget beyond the five years already established.

One of the main challenges involves rebuilding and renovating the homes destroyed in the attack. For instance, how does one differentiate between a person whose home was burned down and a home that was not significantly destroyed except for a few bullet holes, but someone might have been kidnapped or killed in that house? One of the ways Israel intends to address this challenge is through an economic model where towns attacked will receive double compensation from that paid by property tax based on existing law.

Two leading disaster recovery researchers, Laurie Johnson and Robert Olshansky, wrote the book After Great Disasters, examining how various countries responded to rehabilitation efforts, from earthquakes in China to hurricanes in the United States. If learning from the researchers to meet the immense challenge facing the State of Israel, the leaders of the rehabilitation effort must adopt a collaborative and networked leadership approach as opposed to a centralized approach (which has already been proven to fail in the Disengagement rehabilitation efforts). There is a need to continuously involve residents and the community in decision-making processes, paying particular attention to weaker communities that struggle to take the lead.

In reviewing all the cases they examined, they arrived at six central recommendations that should be considered in any rehabilitation process. Here is how they can be relevant to the Israel case.

• Empower existing governance structures and systems to enhance information flow and cooperation. Israel must collaborate closely with kibbutzim, local councils, businesses, and civil society organizations and ensure that all existing parts of the system are partners in the decision-making processes.
• Emphasize data management, communication, transparency, and accountability. Alongside the substantial funding required, quality information and transparency are vital for creating trust in a process expected to be long and full of difficulties and surprises. Rehabilitation effort managers must understand they “work” for the residents and ensure every action is backed by research and reliable data.
• Plan and act simultaneously; act quickly but not hastily. It is imperative to work fast, but it is forbidden to be hasty and make incorrect decisions. It must be considered that the time required for rehabilitation is never quick enough for the residents. On the one hand, realistic expectations must be presented and internalized, and rehabilitation will take a long time and sensitivity must be exhibited to the distress of residents who want to return to their homes. This will require Israel to invest a lot of money in planning consultants and create a decentralized process that allows the railway tracks to be laid while the train is moving.
• Budget for the costs of communication and planning, and update the budget as it progresses. It’s important to remember that not only the recovery goals but also the process must be budgeted. The Tkuma Administration needs to create a stable organizational backbone over time that knows how to ensure the recovery process works efficiently, which will require budgeting.
• Enhance the capabilities of the local government. Most of the administration’s budget will come from the Israeli government, but it is essential to allow local leadership to lead and to grow out of the disaster. They should be allowed to raise independent funds and use resources to rebuild the local governance systems stronger and better.
• Avoid permanent evacuation of residents and communities except in rare cases – and only with the consent of the residents. Currently, the State of Israel is implementing this and aims to allow most residents to return home in the coming months. Some kibbutzim are planning temporary housing for a year or two, and the decision-making process is undertaken in collaboration with the communities. However, it is essential to note that many residents might be excluded from the process and may find themselves leaving the area not out of desire but out of inability to participate. Special resources should be directed to these residents.

Israel faces a tremendous challenge, one it has not known in the past. To successfully meet this challenge, it needs to draw inspiration from the recovery processes of natural disasters around the world – and ask for help from leading experts while emphasizing the unique and national needs of rehabilitating the Gaza border communities. Israel’s past rehabilitation attempts have not met their goals. Failure this time would come at a price it cannot afford.

The writer is the former director of the Reut Institute and an expert on Israel-US relations and world Jewry. He currently studies at the Harvard Kennedy School’s mid-career MPA program.