Noa Argamani and Israel’s fragile ties with China - opinion

The story of Noa Argamani, who was kidnapped by Hamas at the Nova music festival and then rescued by the IDF eight months later, serves as a poignant reflection of the complex and evolving relationship between Israel and China. 

Argamani, a 26-year-old Israeli citizen with a Chinese-born mother, was one of the most recognized faces among the hostages abducted by Hamas. Disturbing footage of her abduction, where she pleaded for her life while desperately reaching towards her boyfriend (Avinatan Or, who is still in captivity) being marched alongside her, circulated globally. 

Argamani was kidnapped during Hamas’s October 7 massacre, which saw some 3,000 terrorists burst across the border into Israel by land, air, and sea, killing around 1,200 people, seizing 251 hostages – mostly civilians – and perpetrating many acts of brutality and sexual assault. Argamani was rescued, along with three other hostages, in an operation by Israeli special forces from an apartment building in central Gaza.

Beijing refused to help

Throughout the eight months of captivity, the Foreign Ministry and the Israel Embassy in Beijing made numerous attempts to persuade Chinese officials to assist in her release, given that her mother was Chinese-born. 

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu asked Chinese President Xi Jinping to help secure the release of Argamani, whose mother is dying of cancer. Despite persistent appeals, Beijing refused to help, either by ignoring the humanitarian requests or citing the fact that her mother, Liora (born in Wuhan as Li Chung Hong), had to renounce her citizenship, as Chinese law does not permit dual nationality, thereby disclaiming any responsibility. 

A Chinese official remarked to an Israeli counterpart that Noa Argamani was “only half Chinese” and “lacked Chinese blood,” thus they would not assist her. Also, efforts by Israeli-Chinese friendship associations to aid Argamani and her family proved unsuccessful. An Israeli source expressed profound disappointment with Beijing’s response, highlighting the absence of active assistance and the lack of empathy.

The fact that Argamani also holds Israeli citizenship through her father is irrelevant under Chinese law. This places legal and moral obligations on the Chinese government to work for Argamani’s release. By conferring citizenship on her and not recognizing her Israeli nationality as a matter of domestic law, China is obligated to assist her during her distress. In major emergencies such as wars, Chinese embassies are responsible for the safety of Chinese citizens abroad, as outlined in the country’s first consular protection regulation.

Furthermore, Argamani’s release from Gaza elicited a cold and indifferent response in Chinese media and social networks. Chinese outlets scarcely mentioned the hostages’ release, instead concentrating on the devastation in Gaza following the operation. For instance, the Xinhua News Agency, China’s official state news agency, briefly noted the “rescue” without mentioning Argamani by name, only stating that four hostages were rescued in the operation. 

Disproportionate media attention

Meanwhile, they provided extensive coverage of the 210 deaths in Gaza resulting from Israeli attacks. On social media platforms, attention was drawn to disturbing images of the operation’s aftermath, with some citing genocide committed by Israeli forces. 

Weibo, a central Chinese social media platform, showed limited interest, with top posts focusing on the broader conflict in Gaza. Many posts on these platforms justified Argamani’s kidnapping as a “legitimate uprising against foreign occupation,” with one viral comment suggesting, “It seems she ate better than the poor Gaza children.”

The Sino-Israeli relationship has flourished over the past two decades, particularly in the economy, tourism, culture, and academic cooperation. However, tensions have arisen since the outbreak of the Gaza war. China did not condemn Hamas’s actions, express sympathy for Israeli suffering, and later criticized Israel for the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. China did voice “deep concern” over escalating tensions in the Middle East but did not condemn Iran’s missile and drone strikes. 

Additionally, a significant amount of Chinese weaponry was discovered during the Gaza war, prompting surprise and questions about its origins and distribution to Hamas. Two-way trade between China and Israel has grown significantly, from over $50 million in 1992 to a peak of $17.6 billion in 2022, with China seeking Israel’s expertise in technology and Israel aiming to access the Chinese market. 

However, trade between the two countries experienced a sharp decline of 7.4% in 2023 compared to the previous year, partly due to Israeli domestic political turbulence and the war in Gaza. Additionally, since the war began, few Chinese officials have visited Israel, and the number of Chinese tourists entering Israel has plummeted from a high of 156,000 annually in 2019 to around 300.

China’s pro-Palestine stance and alignment with Iran are impacting the Israeli public’s positive perception of China. A 2019 Pew Research poll showed that 66% of Israelis viewed China favorably, compared to 25% with an unfavorable view. However, a 2022 Pew Research poll revealed a divided opinion among Israelis, with almost equal proportions holding negative (46%) and positive opinions (48%).

Unfavorable views of China among Israelis rose by 21 percentage points. Nearly half (48%) of Israelis believe that China does not consider their country’s interests at all, while 33% think it doesn’t consider them much. 

Despite this, 77% of Israelis see their relationship with China as good and perceive China’s global influence as growing. A 2024 survey by INSS revealed a significant deterioration in Israeli attitudes toward China, with 54% viewing China as unfriendly or hostile. Only 15% saw China as friendly or an ally, while 31% responded with “don’t know,” marking a sharp contrast from previous years.

The Gaza war has highlighted the limitations of the Sino-Israeli relationship, which has primarily been driven by economic interests, particularly in innovation and technology. China’s stance on the war, marked by its lack of condemnation of Hamas and anti-Israel rhetoric in Chinese state media and on social media, has raised concerns in Israel about China’s reliability as a partner. This is particularly troubling given the growing US-China rivalry, which has led China to strengthen its ties with Iran and its proxies while downplaying its relationship with Israel.

The ongoing Gaza war and the potential escalation of the conflict to other regions could further strain Sino-Israeli relations, prompting a re-evaluation of their ties. Israel is increasingly aware that it cannot rely on China, as the humanitarian case of Noa Argamani illustrates, and this realization will likely shape their relationship in the coming years. 

Consequently, Sino-Israeli relations will face new challenges post-Gaza war. At the same time, the two countries may still find ways to cooperate on shared interests. The trajectory of their relationship will depend on several factors, including the evolution of the Israel-Hamas conflict, the dynamics of the US-China rivalry, public perceptions, heightened national security concerns, and China’s strategic priorities in the Middle East.

The writer is a senior lecturer at the School of Politics and Government and of Multidisciplinary Studies in Social Sciences at Ashkelon Academic College, and a research fellow at the Asian Studies Department of the University of Haifa, specializing in Chinese foreign and strategic relations.