What the new Middle East chessboard means for Israel - opinion

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, after more than a decade of civil war, represents a geopolitical rupture. His survival depended on complex alliances with Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah. Now, questions arise as to whether this downfall was part of a broader deal—one that granted Assad safe passage, allowed Russia to refocus amid global negotiations, and reshaped the regional order.

With Assad gone, Iran’s influence has suffered a decisive blow. The offensive that toppled his regime also weakened Hezbollah and isolated Iranian forces, removing a linchpin of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance.” Yet this strategic gain for Iran’s opponents does not guarantee stability. Rival factions are competing to fill the vacuum, leaving Israel confronted with new and unpredictable threats.

Israel faces a profoundly altered security environment. While the demise of a longstanding adversary offers a brief reprieve, the ascent of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham near its northern frontier is alarming. HTS, rooted in al-Qaeda, has seized major territories and proclaims ambitions extending beyond Syria’s borders. 

Lacking prospects for Western reconstruction aid due to its extremist credentials, the rebel group may consolidate power through radicalism, openly threatening Jerusalem and Mecca. This places Israel and Saudi Arabia in the crosshairs of a group adept at exploiting chaos. For the next US president, Donald Trump, who vowed to end foreign entanglements, the rise of HTS complicates any aspirations for disengagement.

Russia’s position in Syria is also uncertain. The hasty withdrawal from several bases amid HTS’s advance raises the question: Will Moscow abandon its prized naval facility at Tartus? Such a retreat would dent President Vladimir Putin’s prestige and influence, especially when forced out by a group far less equipped than Ukraine’s Western-backed forces. 

Having pounded anti-Assad factions for years, Russia cannot expect accommodation from HTS. Losing Syrian footholds undermines Russian power projection, not just in the Middle East but across Africa, where thousands of its mercenaries rely on Syrian logistics. With the Ukraine war and sanctions constraining Moscow’s options, the loss of these assets could create openings for China and Iran to expand their influence in Africa.

Competing agendas

WITHIN SYRIA, the battlefield has fragmented into competing agendas. The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), aligned with secular and democratic principles, see a chance to consolidate autonomy but remain threatened by Turkey and its Syrian National Army proxies. Ankara, determined to prevent Kurdish self-rule, might deepen its involvement, risking costly entanglements and tension with both Jerusalem and Washington. Meanwhile, remnants of Iranian-backed militias persist, ensuring Tehran remains a latent threat to Israel, even if weakened.

Israel, aware of these shifting dynamics, is already moving to secure its northern border. Recent operations aimed at creating a buffer zone in southern Syria reflect a strategic priority: pre-empting extremist advances and deterring Iranian proxies. This approach underscores a broader effort to recalibrate security postures across the region.

Jordan, traditionally seen as a moderate ally in the region and a partner of the West, has long cultivated a delicate balancing act in its domestic and foreign policies. However, Amman’s willingness to tolerate, and at times bolster, Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood reveals a more pragmatic and troubling strategy. 

For decades, the Hashemite Kingdom has leveraged the Brotherhood as a political counterweight to internal dissent, while its tacit acceptance of Hamas’s presence has been similarly calculated. Jordan views Hamas—a proxy of Iran and an implacable enemy of Israel—not only as a buffer against domestic unrest but as a tool to exert pressure on its neighbor and rival.

This dual strategy comes at a cost. By allowing Hamas to maintain influence, Jordan has indirectly reinforced Iran’s regional ambitions. Amman’s approach also aligns with its historical preference for maintaining an “enemy within reach,” believing that limited engagement with such actors can insulate it from more severe threats. However, this calculated ambiguity risks backfiring. As Iran’s influence in Syria recedes and jihadist groups surge along Jordan’s northern border, the kingdom may find itself ill-equipped to address the blowback from its own strategies.

Jordan’s tacit support for Hamas undermines regional stability and places it at odds with Israel’s efforts to contain Iranian proxies. Furthermore, as jihadist factions seek to exploit Syria’s porous borders, Jordan may soon face a scenario where its attempts to placate Islamist actors only serve to embolden them. The Hashemite Kingdom’s gamble with the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas is becoming increasingly precarious, raising the stakes for both its domestic stability and its relations with Israel.

Syria’s collapse also reverberates through neighboring states. Lebanon, economically fragile and politically beholden to Hezbollah, faces further destabilization as Tehran’s influence wanes. Without reliable Syrian support, Hezbollah may intensify its grip on Lebanon’s politics, worsening an already dire crisis. 

Jordan, long a haven of relative calm, must now defend against the spread of jihadist groups seeking to exploit porous borders. The Gulf states, having tentatively normalized ties with Assad, must reassess their strategies in a landscape where Iran has been weakened, but extremist threats persist. This upheaval signals to other autocratic regimes the limits of relying on foreign patrons and brute force to maintain authority.

For Israel, the priority is to leverage the strategic openings created by Assad’s fall while mitigating the risks of emboldened extremists. It must reinforce intelligence capabilities, neutralize remaining Iranian proxies, and deepen diplomatic engagement with partners like Jordan and the Gulf states. Such efforts are essential in a region now defined by shifting alliances, fragmented authority, and the uncertain role of global powers.

The collapse of Assad’s regime marks the start of a new and volatile chapter. Whether this upheaval leads to a more stable order or plunges the Middle East into further discord depends on the strategic choices that regional and international actors make now. For Israel and its neighbors, the challenge is to navigate an environment reshaped by the simultaneous weakening of Iran, the unsettling rise of jihadist actors, and the uncertain recalculations of global powers.

Catherine Perez-Shakdam is executive director of We Believe In Israel and the Forum for Foreign Relations. Dr. Stepan Stepanenko is director of research and strategy at the Forum for Foreign Relations.